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Abstract
We outline four connections between xenophobia and punitiveness toward criminals in a
national sample of Americans. First, among self-identified whites xenophobia is more
predictive of punitiveness than specific forms of racial animus. Second, xenophobia and
punitiveness are strongly connected among whites, but are only moderately and weakly
related among black and Hispanic Americans, respectively. Third, among whites substantial
proportions of the variance between sociodemographic, political, and religious predictors of
punitiveness are mediated by levels of xenophobia. Finally, xenophobia is the strongest
overall predictor of punitiveness among whites. Overall, xenophobia is an essential aspect
of understanding public punitiveness, particularly among whites.
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Trump
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Introduction
When Donald Trump sailed down an escalator at Trump Towers in Manhattan and
announced his candidacy for President of the United States with a long, extemporaneous
speech, his opening, defamatory remarks about immigrants received the most media
coverage:
When do we beat Mexico at the border? They’re laughing at us, at our
stupidity. And now they are beating us economically. They are not our friend,
believe me. But they’re killing us economically. The U.S. has become a
dumping ground for everybody else’s problems. [applause] Thank you. It’s
true. And these are the best and the finest. When Mexico sends its people,
they’re not sending their best. They’re not sending you [pointing to crowd].
They’re not sending you. They’re sending people that have lots of problems,
and they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs.
They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good
people…. It’s coming from more than Mexico. It’s coming from all over
South and Latin America, and it’s coming probably— probably—from the
Middle East. But we don’t know. Because we have no protection and we have
no competence. We don’t know what’s happening. And it’s got to stop and
it’s got to stop fast.1
While the media noted that Trump’s characterization of immigrants clearly traded in broad,
negative stereotypes, his sweeping condemnation of outsiders struck a chord with
Republican primary and general election voters (Whitehead, Perry, and Baker 2018), with
support from substantial shares of older white voters in swing states in the Sun Belt
(Florida and North Carolina) and Rust Belt (Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin)
(Frey 2016).
Accompanying his xenophobic stance toward foreigners, Trump’s campaign
promised a wide range of punitive actions not only against standard rhetorical outsiders
such as terrorists and criminals, but also against immigrants, refugees, and Muslims. The
popularity of Trump’s message and his electoral victories highlight the importance of
understanding the connections between xenophobia and punitiveness, particularly among
white Americans. Building on theories of racial threat and empirical studies of racial
animus and punitiveness, we examine patterns of punitiveness in relation to xenophobia, a
more generalized construct than specific forms of racial and ethnic animus, with potentially
more useful measures.
Racial Threat, Animus, and Punitiveness
Hegemonic social groups—such as white elites and the middle and upper class in Western
countries—often identify racial and ethnic minorities as “social threats.” Racial threat
theory proposes that social control is wielded by powerful groups in response to perceived
threats to their collective interests (Liska 1992). When hegemonic white groups perceive
non-whites as competition for scarce resources and threats to the power and privileges their
social groups enjoy, they (either explicitly or implicitly) display discriminatory behavior,
leading to structural inequalities (Blalock 1967). As initially posited, racial threat theory
proposes macro, structural explanations for differential levels of social control directed
toward minorities in specific spatial areas. Accordingly, research testing the theory has
primarily focused on the relationship between macro demographic predictors, such as the
size of and changes to minority populations, and forms of social control, such as rates of
arrest for minorities (Parker, Stults, and Rice 2005), the use of police force (Chamlin 1989;
Jacobs and O’Brien 1998), and enforcing capital punishment (Jacobs and Carmichael 2002).
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While originally posited to explain macro level patterns of social conflict, racial
threat theory also provides a useful framework for examining and understanding social
psychological patterns of racial prejudice and punitiveness, as fear is the precursor to
prejudice (Stephan and Stephan 2000). Further, Blalock’s (1967: 29) theory explicitly
posited fear of minority threats as the link between macro level sociodemographic patterns
and the motivations for enacting punitive social policies. Integrating these two levels of
analysis, researchers have shown that changes to demographic patterns can result in
increased perceptions of threat among the public (Quillian 1995). However, while the
population dynamics of minority groups and the perceived threat of minorities are related,
they have also been shown to exert independent and interactive effects on punitive ideology
at the individual level (King and Wheelock 2007; Stewart et al. 2015).
For instance, demonstrating the potentially complex relationship between
population dynamics and public perceptions of threat, Hispanic Americans have been found
to be perceived as more threatening where their population numbers are both scarce (Welch
at al. 2011) and prevalent (Eitle and Taylor 2008). Importantly then, perceptions of social
threat are not wholly dependent on residential proximity or population size, as the
conflation of race and crime exists even in homogeneous and hegemonic residency areas
(Chiricos, Welch, and Gertz 2004). In terms of magnitude, when examined together,
perceived threat has been found to have a stronger relationship to support for punitive
policies than population dynamics (Chiricos et al. 2014; King and Wheelock 2007; Wang
2012).
Perceived threats from outgroups may be cultural, economic, or criminal in
orientation (Chiricos et al. 2014). Cross-cultural research has shown increased support for
punitiveness particularly when minorities are perceived as an economic threat (Wheelock,
Semukhina, and Demidov 2011). Accordingly, changes to unemployment rates and the size
of minority populations can trigger the desire to punish among whites who perceive
minorities as strains on material resources (Stewart et al. 2015). Another important
dimension of the link between perceived threat and punitiveness is when outgroups are
stereotyped as more criminal, as such views have been shown to be a strong and consistent
predictor of punitive attitudes (Barkan and Cohn 2005; Chiricos et al. 2004; Pickett et al.
2014; Stewart et al. 2015; Stupi, Chiricos, and Gertz 2016; Welch et al. 2011; Welch 2016).
Similar to studies of perceived threat, empirical research has shown consistent, crosscultural evidence linking animus against specific minority groups to support for harsh
criminal justice policies (Barkan and Cohn 2005; Unnever and Cullen 2007; Unnever and
Cullen 2010a, 2010b). Although hardly a novel strategy (see Mendelberg 1997), Donald
Trump’s rhetoric and electoral success reiterates that these patterns of public punitiveness
provide ample opportunity for exploitation by opportunistic politicians who can denigrate
minority groups as having “no place in our society” in order to portray themselves
“protectors” (Unnever and Cullen 2010a: 852).
Xenophobia and Punitiveness
Nearly all of the empirical research on racial animus and punitiveness operationalizes
minority threat perception by asking about specific racial or ethnic groups (for an exception,
see Chiricos et al. 2014); however, the broader concept of xenophobia may offer a better way
of examining perceptions of minority threat by measuring outgroup animus without forcing
individuals to identify as overtly racist toward specific targets, which is significantly
influenced by social desirability bias (Krumpal 2012).
Importantly, racism and xenophobia are related but conceptually distinct phenomena
(Bernasconi 2014; Sundstrom and Kim 2014; Wimmer 1997). Racism reflects nationalized
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narratives and a “social/historical structure and a set of accumulated signifiers” (Omi and
Winant, 2015:125), often devolving, at least in Western societies, to the binary difference
between black and white (Sundstrom and Kim 2014). Whereas racism focuses on physical
characteristics to identify a specific outgroup that is deemed inferior, xenophobia focuses
more on a sense of fear of the unknown and of a generalized outgroup which exists outside
the community (UNESCO n.d.). Thus, the differences between racism and xenophobia can
be understood in terms of hierarchization, as racism implies outgroups can be ranked, while
xenophobia identifies a generalized outgroup without rankings beyond a “them vs. us”
dichotomy (Wimmer 1997). As a result, xenophobia and racism can be placed on a
continuum of increasingly exclusive discourses. So although racism and xenophobia are
clearly related—racists will also tend to be xenophobes, but less likely the inverse2—there
is a conceptual difference between a generalized distrust of those-who-are-not-us and
devaluations of more specific groups identified by physical characteristics.
While distinct, there are also, of course, many similarities between racism and
xenophobia. Like racism, xenophobic beliefs are stereotyped understandings of particular
categories of people based on erroneous inference biases, which are used as shortcuts for
quickly reading daily interactions (Rydgren 2004). Also like racism, “essentialism” is a
primary tool for implementing exclusion, as beliefs about perceived essential differences
provide the foundation for dehumanization and demonization (Chiricos, Welch, and Gertz
2004: 379). Ultimately it is best to understand xenophobia and racism as related, but
distinct, social phenomena.
Hypotheses
So what place should xenophobia have in broader theories about and assessments of racial
threat, animus, and punitiveness? To answer this general research question, we test four
specific hypotheses about the connections between xenophobia and punitive ideology using
a national sample of Americans.
H1: Xenophobia will be a stronger predictor of punitiveness than more specific forms
of racial animus among self-identified whites.
H2: Xenophobia will be a stronger predictor of punitiveness among self-identified
whites than among self-identified racial minorities.
H3: Xenophobia will significantly mediate the relationships between
sociodemographic, political, and religious characteristics and punitiveness among
self-identified whites.
H4: Xenophobia will be the strongest overall predictor of punitiveness among selfidentified whites.
Data
We test these hypotheses by analyzing data from Wave I of the Chapman Survey of
American Fears, which was collected in April of 2014. The survey was developed with the
intent of assessing a wide range of topics involving fear and anxiety, and also included
standard sociodemographic, political, and religious questions. The data were collected by
GfK (previously Knowledge Networks), drawing from its online KnowledgePanel pool of
respondents. KnowledgePanel is a probability-based web panel initially generated through
random digit phone dialing, then maintained using the Service Delivery Sequence File from
the United States Postal Service, which includes households without telephone lines. GfK is
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a long-standing (founded in 1934) consumer research firm with expertise in probability
samples. Based in Germany, GfK acquired Knowledge Networks in 2011.
The data were tailored to be representative of the adult population of the United
States. Selected households were asked to participate in an online panel study. Households
that agreed to participate but did not have the necessary equipment were provided a
computer and internet connection in order to complete the survey. After being added to the
panel pool, respondents are asked to participate in select surveys and given unique login
identifiers to access relevant surveys. In general, this mode of survey collection has been
shown to be a reliable method for generating parametric national samples (see Baker et al.
2010; Chang and Krosnick 2009; Yeager et al. 2011). The completion of the survey in an
online, anonymous mode also helped reduce desirability bias for questions on sensitive
topics.
The 2014 Survey of American Fears was administered in English. GfK first
administered a pre-test to 35 respondents to ensure that questions were clear and
participants adequately understood the procedure. After the successful pre-test, 2,500
respondents were recruited from the panel to answer the questionnaire. Of the 2,500
recruited, 1,572 completed the survey.3
Measures
Dependent Variable
The outcome of interest is an index of punitiveness based on a six-question battery with a
prompt that read: “The criminal justice system should….” The specific items were: “Make
sentences more severe for all crimes”; “Use the death penalty for juveniles who murder”;
“Limit the appeals available for death sentences”; “Use ‘three strikes’ laws for repeat
offenders”; “Use chemical castration on sex offenders”; and “Reduce the privileges available
to prisoners (televisions, recreation, etc.).” Each question had answer choices coded from
strongly disagree (0) to strongly agree (3), such that higher scores indicate greater
punitiveness. A principal components factors analysis yielded a single factor with an
Eigenvalue of 3.7 and all items loading at ≥ .745. The index has a Cronbach’s α = .871.
Primary Independent Variables
To test whether views of immigrants are more predictive of punitiveness than specific forms
of racial animus (H1), we use three “feeling thermometers,” which asked respondents to rate
how they felt about specific groups of people on a scale from 0 to 100. We used feeling
thermometer measures for “blacks,” “Hispanics,” and “immigrants” to predict the punitive
ideology index among self-identified white respondents.
After this initial assessment, we turn to the primary predictor of interest, which is an
index of xenophobia based on multiple indicators from a prompt that read: “Please indicate
your level of agreement with the following statements about immigrants.” The items in the
battery of questions about xenophobia were designed to tap into fears regarding
immigration among Americans. Researchers developing xenophobia scales for different
countries or to be applied cross-nationally (e.g. Jolly and DiGiusto 2014; van der Veer et al.
2011; van der Veer et al. 2013) have emphasized that such measures should reflect
commonly held fears regarding unknown others. The Chapman University survey team
conducted small group interviews and reviewed news reports to identify key terms in
American discourse on immigration. Though the items differ slightly, they are comparable
to those used by Jolly and DiGiusto (2014) and van der Veer et al. (2011).
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The six specific statements used to create the additive index of xenophobia were:
“Recent immigrants are more reluctant to assimilate than previous immigrants”;
“Immigrants are a drain on the economy”; “Immigrants bring diseases into the United
States”; “Immigrants are more likely to commit crime than U.S. citizens”; “Deportation is a
good solution for immigration issues”; and “Creating a ‘pathway to citizenship’ will
encourage illegal immigration.” Each question had answer choices coded from strongly
disagree (0) to strongly agree (3), such that higher scores indicate greater xenophobia. A
principal components factor analysis yielded a single factor with an Eigenvalue of 3.7 and
all items loading at ≥ .730. The index has a Cronbach’s α = .881.4 Combined, these
indicators provide a composite measure of xenophobia that incorporates perceptions of
economic, cultural, and criminal threat from immigrants.5
Another predictor of interest is the self-identified race or ethnicity of respondents,
which was coded into four mutually exclusive dummy variables for white, black, Hispanic,
and mixed or “other” race. Whites are used as the reference category in multivariate
analyses of the full sample. To test whether there are significant interaction effects between
self-identified race/ethnicity and xenophobia for predicting punitiveness (H2), we created
three multiplicative terms for the xenophobia index and each of the self-identified
racial/ethnic categories other than white.6 In models assessing these interactions, the lower
order coefficient for xenophobia represents its slope on punitiveness among whites, while
the interaction terms assess whether there are statistically significant differences in the
slopes of xenophobia among each of the other racial and ethnic categories compared to
whites (see Aiken and West 1991).
Control Variables
We also use a number of control variables to account for factors that have been shown to
predict punitiveness, including sociodemographic, political, and religious characteristics, as
well as fear of crime, perceived safety, and viewing television shows about crime.
Specifically, we account for sociodemographic factors shown to be important negative
predictors of punitiveness, such as education level (King and Wheelock 2007), income (Stupi
et al. 2016), being currently employed (Stewart et al. 2015), and being a woman (Wang
2012), as well as factors found to have a positive relationship with punitiveness, such as age
(Chiricos et al. 2004), being married (Costelloe, Chiricos, and Gertz 2009), urban residence
(Unnever and Cullen 2010b), and living in the South (Chiricos et al. 2004; Unnever and
Cullen 2007). Education was measured in degree categories, ranging from less than high
school (1) to bachelor’s degree or higher (4). Annual personal income was measured in
categories ranging from less than $5,000 (1) to $175,000 or more (19).7 Gender, marital
status, and employment were coded as three separate dummy variables, such that women,
those currently married, and those currently employed = 1. Age was measured in years,
ranging from 18 to 92. Rural/urban status was coded as a dummy variable depending on
whether a respondent’s location was classified by the Census Bureau as metro (1) or nonmetro (0). Region of the country was coded into four dummy variables for South,
Northeast, Midwest, and West based on Census designations. South is used as the
reference category in multivariate models.
A consistent and strong predictor of punitive ideology is political identity, with
conservatives averaging higher levels of punitiveness (Stupi et al. 2016; Wang 2012). To
account for this relationship we used a question that read: “How would you describe
yourself politically?” Answer choices ranged from “extremely conservative” (1) to
“extremely liberal” (7), with “moderate” (4) as the middle category.
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Religion has also been shown to significantly predict punitiveness. Specifically,
fundamentalist Protestant affiliation and beliefs increase punitiveness (King and Wheelock
2007). The strongest connection between religion and increased punitiveness has been
found for belief in religious evil, with believers in such concepts as Satan and hell being
much more punitive than non-believers (Baker and Booth 2016). Once these aspects of
religious ideology are accounted for, higher levels of religious practice may reduce
punitiveness. To account for the complex and potentially multivalent effects of religion on
punitiveness, we included three religious control measures: 1) religious affiliation; 2) a belief
orthodoxy index that includes fundamentalist views of the Bible and beliefs about religious
evil; and 3) a measure of religious service attendance. Affiliation was coded into dummy
variables for Protestant, Catholic, “other” Christian, Jewish, “other” religion, and no
religion. Protestants are used as the reference category for multivariate models. The
fundamentalist orthodoxy measure combined questions addressing biblical literalism, the
belief that “Satan causes most evil in the world,” and the belief that “the world will end as
prophesied in the Bible.” Stance on the Bible was measured on an ordinal scale from “The
Bible is an ancient book of history and legends” (1) to “The Bible means what it says. It
should be taken literally word-for-word on all subjects” (5). Belief that “Satan causes most
evil” and that Armageddon is impending were measured from “strongly disagree” (1) to
“strongly agree” (4), with higher scores indicating greater orthodoxy. The index had a
Cronbach’s α = .73.8 Religious service attendance was measured from “never” (1) to
“several times a week” (8).
Individuals’ perceptions of their own safety (Chiricos, McEntire, and Gertz 2001)
and fears about crime (Eitle and Taylor 2008) are also important aspects of punitiveness,
particularly from the perspective of racial threat theory. To control for perceived safety, we
created an index based on five questions that asked about how safe respondents felt in their
homes at night, walking alone at night, in their neighborhoods, in their cities, and at their
work or school. Answer choices were coded from “not safe at all” (1) to “very safe” (4). The
index had a Cronbach’s α = .817. For fear of crime, we created an index by combining nine
questions from a battery that asked: “How afraid are you of being victimized in the
following ways?” The specific questions were about being the victim of mugging, gang
violence, identity theft, stalking, murder, police brutality, sexual assault, racial/hate crime,
and mass public shootings. Answer choices were coded from “not afraid at all” (0) to “very
afraid” (3). The fear of crime index had a Cronbach’s α = .928.
Lastly, we included an index that assessed levels of viewing television in general,
and shows about crime specifically, as the consumption of media about crime has been
shown to predict attitudes about criminal punishment (Rosenberger and Callanan 2011).
Respondents were asked how frequently they watched TV in general, “true” crime shows
(such as Dateline or America’s Most Wanted), and fictional crime shows (such as CSI or Law
& Order). Answer choices were coded from “never” (1) to “very often” (5). The TV viewing
index had a Cronbach’s α = .676.9
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all variables used in the study (other than
the multiplicative interaction terms), as well as the bivariate correlation between each
predictor and the punitive ideology index. Providing initial support for H1, for the feeling
thermometer measures (among self-identified whites only), views of immigrants have the
highest correlation with punitiveness (r = -.38), as well as a significantly lower overall mean
score ( = 56.2) compared to specific animus toward “blacks” (r = -.23; = 68.3) and
“Hispanics” (r = -.26; = 65.6).10 Providing initial support for H4, the xenophobia index
has by far the strongest correlation to punitiveness (r = .45) among the independent
variables in the full sample, with political liberalism a distant second (r = .29).
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Study
Variable

Mean

S.D.

Punitiveness
7.19
4.19
Xenophobia
8.96
4.05
Blacks therm.a
68.32
24.12
Hispanics therm.a
65.54
25.85
Immigrants
56.21
28.53
therm.a
White
0.66
0.47
Black
0.12
0.32
Hispanic
0.14
0.35
Other/mixed race
0.06
0.24
Education
2.74
1.01
Income
11.89
4.52
Gender
1.52
0.50
Married
0.51
0.50
Age
46.86
17.25
Employed
0.56
0.50
Political liberalism
3.77
1.44
Urban
0.84
0.37
South
0.37
0.48
Northeast
0.18
0.39
Midwest
0.22
0.41
West
0.23
0.42
Protestant
0.36
0.48
Catholic
0.23
0.42
Other Christian
0.12
0.33
Jewish
0.02
0.14
Other religion
0.08
0.27
No religion
0.18
0.39
Service attendance
3.94
2.48
Belief orthodoxy
4.85
2.85
Perceived safety
14.55
2.95
Fear crime
6.94
6.05
TV Crime Viewing
9.13
2.74
Source: 2014 Chapman Survey of American Fears
* p < .05; ** p < .01
a: Descriptives among white respondents only

Min

Max

0
0
0
0

18
18
100
100

0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
18
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
5
0
3

100
1
1
1
1
4
19
2
1
92
1
7
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
8
10
20
24
15

r with
Punitiveness
--.446**
-.225***
-.261***
-.383***
.075**
-.127**
-.038
.066*
-.140**
.004
-.047
.048
.109**
-.051
-.288**
.020
.025
.049
-.045
-.030
.083**
.069**
.020
-.081**
-.037
-.142**
.063*
.232**
-.072**
.111**
.130**

Analytic Strategy
We begin by comparing the relative power of feeling thermometers about “blacks,”
“Hispanics,” and “immigrants” for predicting punitive ideology (H1). Because two of the
questions are about racial and ethnic minorities who comprise a substantial proportion of
respondents to the survey, we conduct the comparative examination among self-identified
white respondents only, so as not to bias the assessments against the measures of specific
forms of racial animus compared to a non-racially specific view of “immigrants.” Table 2
presents OLS regression models using the index of punitiveness as the outcome. The
models provide a test of the relative magnitude of the partial correlations between specific
forms of racial animus compared to a more generalized xenophobia (or philia) for predicting
punitiveness. We sequence the models such that each feeling thermometer is used
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independently first. This allows for comparisons of the size of the coefficients across the
models. We then include all the feeling thermometer measures in the same model to see
which ones remain significant predictors. Finally, we include all the feeling thermometer
measures along with our primary multi-item xenophobia index to see how the composite
measure compares to the single-item thermometer measures for immigrants and specific
racial and ethnic groups.
After establishing the relative efficacy of the more comprehensive xenophobia index,
we then assess the bivariate relationship between xenophobia and punitiveness for those
who self-identify as different races and ethnicities using scatter plots fitted with
Epanechnikov kernel density function LOESS lines. This provides an initial assessment of
the interaction between racial/ethnic self-identification and xenophobia for predicting
punitive ideology (H2). We also assess whether there are significant differences in the
correlations between xenophobia and punitiveness across racial and ethnic groups. Next,
we staged OLS models predicting the punitive ideology index such that the first model
includes the interactions of interest between race/ethnicity and xenophobia, the second
model shows only the controls without the xenophobia index or interaction terms, and the
third model includes the xenophobia index, multiplicative interaction terms, and all
controls. Models 1 and 3 in Table 4 provide a baseline and robust assessment of the
hypothesized interactions (H2), respectively. All variables were mean centered before entry
into the models, with the exception of the xenophobia measure and multiplicative terms, for
ease of graphically representing the results.
The changes in coefficients for the control variables between Models 2 and 3 in
Table 4 provide an initial assessment of the potential mediating effects of xenophobia for
social status characteristics and perceptions of crime and safety (H3). We then offer a more
rigorous analysis of these mediating effects by using PROCESS modeling developed by
Hayes (2013), an expansion of earlier work by Preacher and Hayes (2004, 2008). This
method uses a bias-correcting bootstrapping technique to provide a direct assessment of
mediating relationships, and has been shown to provide more accurate estimates of indirect
effects than other analytic methods (Williams and MacKinnon 2008). We derived estimates
of the mediating effects of xenophobia on punitiveness among white Americans using 5,000
bootstrapped samples. These models allow us to empirically assess the extent to which
xenophobia is a cognitive mechanism linking social statuses to punitiveness among whites
(H3).
Finally, we present standardized coefficients—total (indirect and direct) effects for
the controls and direct effect only for the xenophobia index—to evaluate the predictive
strength of xenophobia relative to variables known to significantly influence punitive
ideology among whites (H4). This produces a conservative estimate of the strength of
xenophobia compared to other predictors by accounting for the indirect effects of the
controls, but not any potential indirect effects of xenophobia through other variables. This
allows us to see if and to what extent xenophobia is the strongest predictor of punitiveness
among white Americans, under empirical conditions favorable to other predictors.
Findings
Table 2 compares generalized xenophobia to antipathy toward black and Hispanic
Americans for predicting punitiveness among white respondents using the feeling
thermometer measures. When no controls for xenophobia are included, feelings toward
“blacks” (b = -.022; p < .001) and “Hispanics” (b = -.028; p < .001) are significant predictors
of punitive ideology; however, the coefficient for general feelings toward “immigrants” is
substantially larger (b = -.039; p < .001), and Model 3 explains more variance in
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Table 2. OLS Regressions Predicting Punitive Attitudes by Specific Racial Animus, Views of
Immigrants, and Xenophobia Among Whites (Unstandardized Coefficients Shown)
Model 1
Model 2
Racial Animus
Blacks therm.
-.022***
--Hispanics therm.
---.028***
Xenophobia
----Immigrants therm.
Xeno. Index
----Sociodemographic
s
Education
-.517***
-.458**
Income
.031
.031
Gender
-.498
-.516*
Married
.209
.201
Age
-.002
-.001
Employed
.527
.524
Political liberalism
-.688***
-.682***
Urban residence
.183
.160
Northeastb
.389
.431
Midwestb
-.397
-.366
Westb
.956**
.956**
Religion
-.274
-.247
Catholicc
Other Christianc
.290
.234
Jewishc
-1.586
-1.469
Other religionc
-1.144
-1.132
No religionc
-1.184**
-1.126*
Service attendance
-.129
-.118
Belief orthodoxy
.232***
.235***
Fear of Crime
Perceived safety
-.133**
-.119
Fear of
victimization
.056*
.051
TV Viewing
Crime shows index
.188***
.191***
Model Stats
Constant
12.665
12.949
N
840
840
Adjusted R-squared
.260
.271
Source: 2014 Chapman Survey of American Fears
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
b: South is reference category
c: Protestants are reference category

Model 3
-----

Model 4
.014
-.003

Model 5
.002
.008

-.039***
---

-.044***
---

-.022**
.381***

-.441**
.039
-.421
.178
-.001
.522
-.615***
.219
.323
-.437
.830*

-.423**
.042
-.477
.184
-.001
.498
-.621***
.218
.309
-.462
.774*

-.222
.017
-.359
.201
-.007
.287
-.379***
.401
.392
-.461
.595

-.120
.281
-1.142
-.876
-.997*
-.093
.198**

-.054
.286
-1.109
-.833
-.943*
-.101
.197**

-.111*

-.116*

.036

.034

.005

.175***

.171***

.159***

13.265
840
.305

12.826
840
.305

-.233
-.039
-1.494
-.586
-.752
-.060
.115
-.122**

8.047
830
.376

punitiveness (R2 = .305) than Models 1 (R2 = .260) or 2 (R2 = .271).11 In Model 4, the
measures for specific racial animus toward black and Hispanic Americans are attenuated to
statistical non-significance by including the feelings toward immigrants measure (b = -.044;
p < .001). As a comparative test of measures on the same scale, feelings about immigrants
are a more powerful predictor of punitiveness among whites than more specific forms of
racial animus, supporting H1. In Model 5, the primary xenophobia index similarly reduces
the feelings toward blacks (b = .002; p = .795) and Hispanics (b = .008; p = .395) measures
to non-significance, and also explains a greater proportion of the variance in punitiveness
than the models using only the feeling thermometer measures (R2 = .376 for Model 5).12
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Figure 1. Scatterplots of the Relationship Between Xenophobia and Punitiveness by Self-Identified Race/Ethnicity (with LOESS Lines)
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Turning to the initial test of H2 about the interaction between racial identity and the
strength of the connection between xenophobia and punitiveness, Figure 1 shows
scatterplots with LOESS lines for the xenophobia and punitiveness indices paneled by selfidentified race and ethnicity. There is a strong positive relationship between xenophobia
and punitiveness among whites, a moderate positive relationship among African Americans,
and a weakly positive relationship among Hispanic Americans. This pattern is further
evident in Table 3.
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for the variance of both xenophobia and punitive
ideology within specific racial and ethnic self-designations. Interestingly the xenophobia
measure had the highest standard deviation among Hispanic respondents. This is
informative, as an initial concern we had in fielding the xenophobia measures was whether
they would generate adequate levels of variance among ethnic minority populations. The
results of the Chapman Survey are promising in this regard.
Providing more detail about the patterns shown in Figure 1, the last column in
Table 3 shows the Pearson correlations between xenophobia and punitiveness among
respondents of different racial and ethnic categories. The correlation is significantly
stronger among whites (r = .54) compared to African Americans (r = .25; difference of
correlations test p < .01) and especially Hispanic Americans (r = .15; difference of
correlations test p < .01). This provides additional support for H2. Among respondents of
“other” or mixed races, there was also a strong correlation between xenophobia and
punitiveness (r = .45), but the ambiguity of the category obviates clear interpretations of
this result. In the bivariate context, the weakest correlation between xenophobia and
punitiveness was among Hispanic Americans, presumably because of the cultural
stereotyping of “immigrants” in general with Latino/as specifically (á la Trump).
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations between Xenophobia and Punitiveness by
Self-Identified Race/Ethnicity
Source: 2014 Chapman Survey of American Fears
Mean of
Xeno

S.D. of
Xeno

Mean of
Punitive

S.D. of
Punitive

r of Xeno.
and
Punitive
.542**
.253**
.149*
.446**

White
9.51
4.01
11.03
4.13
Black
8.31
3.42
9.31
4.02
Hispanic
7.32
4.23
10.43
4.16
“Other”/mixed races
8.03
3.98
11.77
4.50
* p < .05; ** p < .01
Note: Differences of correlations between white and black and between white and Hispanic are
significant at .001 level (Fisher’s r to z transformation)

Table 4 presents the OLS models predicting punitiveness among all respondents. In Model
1, only race/ethnicity, xenophobia, and the interaction terms are included. The lower order
terms for mixed or other race respondents (b = 2.138; p < .05) and Hispanic respondents (b
= 3.596; p < .001) were significantly different compared to white respondents. This means
that at the lowest levels of xenophobia (y-intercept), white respondents were less punitive
than Hispanic and mixed race respondents. Xenophobia had a strong and significant
positive effect on punitiveness among whites (b = .555; p < .001), but its effects were
significantly weaker among black (b = -.261; p < .01) and especially Hispanic respondents (b
= -.409; p < .001). In Models 1 and 3, the interaction terms represent the difference in the
slope of the effect for xenophobia on punitiveness compared to whites (e.g., the slope of
xenophobia on punitiveness is .294 [.555 - .261] for black respondents and .146 [.555 .409] for Hispanic respondents in Model 1).
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Table 4. OLS Regressions Predicting Punitive Attitudes by Xenophobia and Self-Identified
Race/Ethnicity (Unstandardized Coefficients Shown)
Model 1
Fear of Immigrants
Xenophobia index
.555***
Race and Ethnicity
1.277
Blacka
3.596***
Hispanica
2.138*
Other/mixed racea
Interactions
Black*xenophobia
-.261**
Hispanic*xenophobia
-.409***
Other race*xenophobia
-.054
Sociodemographics
Education
--Income
--Gender
--Married
--Age
--Employed
--Political liberalism
--Urban residence
----Northeastb
--Midwestb
--Westb
Religion
--Catholicc
--Other Christianc
--Jewishc
--Other religionc
--No religionc
Service attendance
--Belief orthodoxy
--Fear of Crime
Perceived safety
--Fear of victimization
--TV Viewing
Crime shows index
--Model Stats
Constant
5.738
N
1407
.235
Adjusted R-squared
Source: 2014 Chapman Survey of American Fears
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
a: Whites are reference category
b: South is reference category
c: Protestants are reference category

Model 2
---2.190***
-.774*
1.217**
-------.466***
.044
-.600**
.174
.005
.243
-.675***
.651*
.427
-.474
.479

Model 3
.449***
.891
3.215***
2.664**
-.281**
-.413***
-.091
-.228
.020
-.413*
.191
.003
.184
-.357***
.689*
.397
-.621*
.327

.066
-.210
-1.280
-1.430**
-.680
-.133*
.221***

.081
-.362
-1.069
-1.138*
-.270
-.063
.145**

-.091*
.066**

-.053
.035

.185***
11.063
1263
.193

.154***
6.812
1242
.296

Model 2 includes all sociodemographic, religious, political, and perception of crime
and safety controls, while excluding xenophobia. In this model black (b = -2.190; p < .001)
and Hispanic Americans (b = -.774; p < .05) have significantly lower levels of punitiveness
than whites, while mixed or other race Americans have significantly higher levels of
punitiveness (b = 1.217; p < .01). To reiterate, these are the baseline differences by selfidentified race and ethnicity, whereas the lower order coefficients for race and ethnicity in

Race, Xenophobia, and Punitiveness

14

Models 1 and 3 represent the differences across racial groups at the lowest levels of xenophobia.
In Model 2, respondents with higher levels of education (b = -.466; p < .001), women (b = .600; p < .01), political liberals (b = -.675; p < .001), religious minorities (b = -1.430; p <
.01), those attending religious services more frequently (b = -.133; p < .05), and those with
higher perceived levels of safety (b = -.091; p < .05) all had significantly lower levels of
punitiveness. Urban residence (b = .651; p < .05), higher belief in religious evil (b = .221; p
< .001), fear of victimization (b = .185; p < .001), and higher levels of watching television
about crime (b = .185; p < .001) all had significant positive relationships with higher levels
of punitiveness.
Notably, Model 1 predicted more variance in punitiveness using only self-identified
race/ethnicity and the xenophobia index (adjusted R2 = .235) than Model 2 did with all
control variables, including sociodemographics, political identity, religion measures, fear of
crime, perceived safety, and television crime viewing (adjusted R2 = .193).
Providing strong support for H2, in Model 3 the interaction terms testing for
differential effects of xenophobia on punitiveness between white and black Americans (b = .281; p < .01), as well as between white and Hispanic Americans (b = -.413; p < .001) remain
significant, such that xenophobia has a stronger positive effect on punitiveness among
whites (slope = .449) than it does among black (slope = .168) and especially Hispanic
respondents (slope = .018). These differences are presented graphically in Figure 2.
At the lowest levels of xenophobia index, whites (6.8) are not significantly more
punitive than African Americans, and are significantly less punitive than Hispanic
Americans (b = 3.215; p < .001); however, at the highest levels of xenophobia, whites (14.9)
are much more punitive than both African Americans (9.8) and Hispanic Americans (10.7).
It is also notable that highly xenophobic whites average close to the maximum score (18) on
the punitive ideology index. In sum, there is a very strong connection between xenophobia
and punitive ideology for white Americans, but only a weak connection among African
Americans, and there is essentially no connection between xenophobia and punitiveness
among Hispanic Americans after accounting for control variables.
Comparing Model 2 to Model 3, the effects for education, gender, religious service
attendance, perceived levels of safety, and fear of victimization are all attenuated to
statistical non-significance with the inclusion of the xenophobia and interaction measures.
Similarly the effects for political identity (b = -.357; p < .001) and religious belief orthodoxy
(b = .145; p < .01) are substantially reduced between Models 2 and 3. This provides initial
support for H3 that xenophobia serves as an important mediator connecting
sociodemographic, political, and religious characteristics to higher levels of punitiveness.
To further examine these mediating effects, Table 5 shows the results of the
PROCESS models estimating the direct and indirect effects of significant variables that
showed substantial mediation across the OLS models. Because xenophobia is connected to
punitiveness primarily among whites, these models were conducted using white
respondents only. Table 5 also shows standardized coefficients for total effects for these
variables that incorporate both direct effects and indirect effects (mediated through the
xenophobia index). Xenophobia was a significant predictor of all the variables examined,
with the exception of perceived safety. Consequently, estimates of the indirect effects of
perceived safety through xenophobia were non-significant. For gender, political identity,
religious service attendance, religious belief orthodoxy, and fear of victimization, the indirect
effects through xenophobia were stronger than the respective variables’ direct effects on punitiveness
(indirect-to-total effect ratios above .5). In other words, greater than half of the overall
effects for these variables were indirect, mediated by virtue of being associated with
differential levels of xenophobia.
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Figure 2. Punitive Ideology
by Self-Identified Race/Ethnicity and Xenophobia
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Table 5. Mediation of Significant Predictors of Punitive Attitudes through Xenophobia among
Indirect
Indirect/Total
Direct
β for Total
Effect (b)
Effect (b)
Ratio
Effect
Xenophobia
.449
----.498
Education
-.356
-.317
.471
-.162
-.219
.508
-.052
Gender
-.212
-.429
.533
-.294
Political liberalism
-.376
-.112
.596
-.113
Attendance
-.076
.118
.532
.152
Belief orthodoxy
.104
.060
1.111
.068
Fear of victimization
-.006
Whites
Source: 2014 Chapman Survey of American Fears
PROCESS Mediation Models (see Hayes 2013)

While the indirect effects for education are slightly smaller (indirect-to-total effect ratio =
.47), they were also substantial and significant (b = -.356 for direct effect and b = -.317 for
indirect effect). Thus, we find consistent support for H3, as most of the effects of social
status characteristics on punitiveness among whites are accounted for by differential levels
of xenophobia across such characteristics.
Finally, in support of H4, xenophobia has by far the strongest relationship to
punitiveness among the predictors assessed (β = .498), with a standardized coefficient 69%
higher in absolute value than the second strongest predictor of political identity (β = -.294).
This is particularly noteworthy since the standardized coefficients presented are a
conservative assessment of the relative strength of xenophobia, allowing the other
predictors to include indirect effects as part of the estimates of their respective total
standardized effects.
Discussion
The results show strong support for the four hypothesized connections between xenophobia
and punitiveness. First, xenophobia is a better predictor of punitiveness than more specific
forms of racial animus among white Americans. Second, the relationship between
xenophobia and punitiveness is contingent on self-identified race. There is a much stronger
positive relationship between xenophobia and punitiveness among whites than among black
and Hispanic Americans. While there is a moderate positive relationship between
xenophobia and punitiveness among African Americans, it is significantly weaker than
among whites. Among Hispanic Americans, there is only a very weak connection between
xenophobia and punitiveness after accounting for control variables. Third, xenophobia also
significantly and substantially mediates the relationship between social, religious, and
political characteristics and punitiveness among self-identified whites. Finally, not only
does xenophobia operate as a cognitive mechanism linking status characteristics to
punitiveness among whites, it is by far the strongest overall predictor of punitive attitudes
among whites.
Collectively these findings show that for white Americans negative views of
“immigrant” outsiders provide a dominant framework for justifying harsh penal policies and
practices. Returning to our general research question, xenophobia is an indispensable and
integral aspect of understanding punitive attitudes and perceptions of racial threat,
particularly among whites. Consequently, xenophobia should assume a more central place
in theories about and studies of the relationship between racial threat and punitiveness.
In addition to integrating xenophobia into theories of racial threat, the connections
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between xenophobia and punitiveness in political rhetoric and electoral strategy should also
receive more attention from scholars. Accepting the nomination of the Republican Party for
President, Donald Trump told listeners that:
Nearly 180,000 illegal immigrants, with criminal records, ordered deported
from our country, are tonight roaming free to threaten peaceful citizens….
They are being released, by the tens of thousands, into our communities, with
no regard for the impact on public safety or resources.
A few weeks later, in a speech about immigration, he promised the following as part of his
policy agenda:
This is the one, I think it's so great. It's hard to believe, people don't even talk
about it. Zero tolerance for criminal aliens. Zero. Zero. Zero. They don't
come in here. They don't come in here. According to federal data, there are
at least two million—two million, think of it—criminal aliens now inside of
our country. Two million people, criminal aliens. We will begin moving them
out day one. As soon as I take office, day one.xiii
As the phrasing, emphasis, and intonation made clear, the eventual President believed that
undocumented immigrants warranted extremely harsh punishment.
The fact that Trump’s campaign successfully secured a major party’s nomination and
eventually the Presidency is testament to the prevalence of these views among
contemporary white Americans. Overall this signals a shift away from “dog whistle”
rhetoric about race, crime, and punishment (López 2014), toward more overt “bullhorn”
rhetoric about “criminal aliens.” As politicians, both national and local, follow suit and
increase rhetorical emphasis on immigrants and crime, it is important to understand how
the American public connects these issues.
In short, if politicians are able to stoke fears about immigrants, they can also increase
support for punitive criminal justice policies and practices. The remaking of political
rhetoric about racial threat toward xenophobia also presents a serious impediment to
criminal justice reforms that, for a moment, had attained some bi-partisan support (Obama
2017). To the extent that right-wing politicians link opposition to immigrants and punitive
rhetoric about crime with greater frequency and intensity, support for criminal justice
reform is likely to decline among political conservatives. More disconcerting still, our
analyses show that Trump’s overt focus on immigrants rather than dog whistle coding
about race may be more effective at mobilizing public fears, and therefore animosity toward
those viewed as outsiders.
Due to institutional characteristics of the criminal justice system in the U.S.—such
as electing judges, and politicians beholden to localized constituencies—public opinion
about punishment has a greater impact on policies in the U.S. than in other Western
democracies (Savelsberg 1994). As a result, if public opinion takes a turn back toward
greater punitiveness, harsher public policies are likely to follow. Indeed, recent research
shows that changes in public punitiveness led to changes in social policy and political
messaging, rather than the inverse (Enns 2014, 2016). The decades-long expansion of harsh
punitive policies occurred in the United States because of the voting public’s desire for “just
deserts.” The role of the public’s (perceived) “knowledge” about crime warrants a more
prominent place in the ongoing discourse about the causes of and barriers to the reversal of
mass incarceration. Within such a discussion, the role of perceptions of minority threat
from racial and ethnic “others” must be central rather than peripheral.
Regarding studies of racial threat and animus, xenophobia has some advantages that
recommend its utility. Racial animus measures often ask respondents to select the degree to
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which they hold favorable or unfavorable attitudes about members of specific racial or
ethnic groups. Such measures are primarily useful across groups (i.e., by looking at how
non-black respondents feel about “blacks”); however, questions about non-ethnically
specified “immigrants” allow for flexibility in application and context. Questions about
generic immigrants allow for the possibility of more comparative studies about minority
threat across cultural contexts, regardless of which types of individuals are perceived by
different publics as constituting “immigrants.” Questions about immigrants are also less
likely to be perceived by respondents as eliciting overtly racist attitudes, and can help avoid
desirability bias (see Quillian 2006). Racially or ethnically non-specific measures of
xenophobia effectively split the difference between measures of explicit and implicit racial
bias (Dovido, Kawakami, and Beach 2003).
While our study has contributed to the literature on racial animus and punitiveness
by shifting attention to the importance of xenophobia over specific forms of racial animus, it
is also limited in a number of ways. In particular, a full integration with the theory and
literature on racial threat requires an assessment of population dynamics in relation to
xenophobia. Nested data that can account for levels of and changes to immigrant
populations while assessing individual-level patterns of xenophobia are needed. Testing
these dynamics with data from different national, regional, and cultural contexts is
ultimately what is required for a more comprehensive evaluation of xenophobia within the
context of racial threat theory.
Similarly, aggregate data on levels of xenophobia and punitive policies and practices
are needed to more rigorously evaluate whether and how collective xenophobia shapes
criminal justice policies and outcomes. At the individual level, connecting xenophobia to
psychological traits and outcomes, as well as to social network dimensions, is needed to gain
a better understanding of how xenophobia is similar to, and different from, more specific
forms of racial and ethnic prejudice (see van Zalk, Walter, and Kerr 2014). Also at the
individual level, targeted samples of mixed race Americans with additional questions about
ethnic identity are needed to improve some of the suggestive but ambiguous findings shown
here.
Likewise, while we have shown that xenophobia is a strong predictor of punitiveness
among white Americans, our data are cross-sectional and country specific. Although much
of the research on these topics has been conducted in the West, connections between
xenophobia and socio-political context are by no means limited to Western contexts.
Explorations of the connections between xenophobia and punitiveness in different cultural
contexts, within specific sub-populations, and at higher levels of analysis such as aggregates
of public views within political boundaries (e.g., counties, states, and nations) all warrant
further research. Understanding of the social dynamics of xenophobia is particularly
important to studies of right-wing and penal populism, as these dimensions of ideology are
inextricably connected.
Conclusion
Punitiveness is intimately linked to fear and sense of security. Xenophobia is a uniquely
important dimension of fear in relation to punitiveness because it is fundamentally a fear
about both outsiders and the social order. Attempting to neutralize the fear of change from
outsiders, individuals who are in racial or ethnic in-groups are more likely to hold harsh
attitudes toward outsiders and perceived rule-breakers, and to endorse accompanying
draconian policies. Whenever powerful groups feel threatened, xenophobia is likely to
intensify as the dark underside of in-group solidarity. The endorsement and enactment of
punitive measures by racial and ethnic majorities are an oppressive outgrowth of the fear
that society will soon belong to “them” rather than “us.”
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Notes
1 Quote is from authors’ transcript of the speech. Full text of Trump’s presidential announcement speech is
available at: http://time.com/3923128/donald-trump-announcement-speech/.
2 For instance, in the 2014 Chapman Survey of American Fears, among white respondents who rated “blacks”
below 50 on the feeling thermometer, 78% also rated “immigrants” below 50. Conversely, of white
respondents who rated “immigrants” below 50 on the feeling thermometer, only 35% rated “blacks” below 50.
3 The sociodemographic frequencies in the Chapman Survey compare favorably to those from the 2014
General Social Survey. One area of difference was that the Chapman Survey has significantly more currently
married respondents (58.9%) than the GSS (45.7%). Tabled results of the comparisons are available upon
request.
4 Supplemental analyses with a xenophobia index weighted by factor loadings produced results identical to
those presented.
5 We did not use a question from this battery about whether police should be allowed to conduct raids to find
undocumented immigrants because of its similarity to the punitiveness outcomes. In support of the centrality
of economic concerns in racial threat theory, the measure for whether “immigrants are a drain on the
economy” had a stronger relationship to the punitive ideology outcome (r = .498) than the question about
whether “immigrants are more likely to commit crime” (r = .399).
6 The xenophobia index had high reliability for scaling across the racial and ethnic categories. For black
respondents, the items loaded on a single factor with an Eigenvalue of 3.5. For Hispanic and mixed race
respondents there were single factors with Eigenvalues of 3.7 and 3.8, respectively.
7 We also tested models that used a series of dummy variables for education and income levels. Results did
not differ substantially from those presented, with college graduates being significantly less punitive, and nonsignificant results for income levels. We also tested for potential non-linear effects of income using logged
and quadratic measures. These results were statistically non-significant.
8 We created this index of “belief orthodoxy” that included views of the Bible for consonance with previous
research on punitiveness, but supplemental analyses examining the individual indicators (belief in an active
Satan, belief in future Armageddon, and Bible views) showed that beliefs about Satan were more predictive of
punitive ideology than beliefs about the Bible, Armageddon, or the overall orthodoxy index. This provides a
replication of the recent finding that an important aspect of religiosity for predicting punitiveness is views of
supernatural evil (Baker and Booth 2016).
9 Due to the marginal reliability of the TV viewing index, we conducted supplementary analyses excluding
this control. Focal results for the connections between xenophobia and punitiveness were unchanged. Among
the specific indicators, punitiveness had the highest correlation with consuming “true crime” television shows.
10 P < .001 for paired samples T-tests of the differences between mean scores on the “immigrants”
thermometer compared to the thermometers for “blacks” and “Hispanics.”
11 Z tests for significant differences of coefficients across Models 1–3 (see Paternoster et al. 1998) showed a
statistically significant difference between the coefficients for “blacks” and “immigrants” (Z = 2.40; p = .01)
and a marginally significant difference between the coefficients for “Hispanics” and “immigrants” (Z = 1.60; p
= .05, one-tailed tests).
12 The xenophobia index (VIF = 1.8) had a relatively low level of multicollinearity in this model. The feeling
thermometer measures had elevated, but tolerable, levels of multicollinearity (VIF = 2.6 for “blacks” and
“Hispanics” thermometers; VIF = 3.0 for “immigrants” thermometer).
xiii Quotations are from authors’ transcripts of both speeches. Textual transcripts are publically available for
the nomination speech (http://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/full-transcript-donald-trump-nominationacceptance-speech-at-rnc-225974) and the immigration policy speech (http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-napol-donald-trump-immigration-speech-transcript-20160831-snap-htmlstory.html).

